Abstract. The existence of encryption and commitment schemes secure under selective opening attack (SOA) has remained open despite considerable interest and attention. We provide the rst public key encryption schemes secure against sender corruptions in this setting. The underlying tool is lossy encryption. We then show that no non-interactive or perfectly binding commitment schemes can be proven secure with blackbox reductions to standard computational assumptions, but any statistically hiding commitment scheme is secure. Our work thus shows that the situation for encryption schemes is very dierent from the one for commitment schemes.
Introduction
IND-CPA and IND-CCA are generally viewed as strong notions of encryption security that suce for applications. However, there is an important setting where these standard notions do not in fact imply security and the search for solutions continues, namely, in the presence of selective-opening attack (SOA) [22, 13, 38, 18, 16, 14] . Let us provide some background on SOA and then discuss our results for encryption and commitment.
Background
The problem. Suppose (1 ≤ i ≤ n). It is important here that the messages m [1] , . . . , m[n] might be related, but the coins r [1] , . . . , r [n] are random and independent. Now, the adversary, given c, is allowed to corrupt some size t subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of senders (say t = n/2), obtaining not only their messages but also their coins, so that it has m[i], r[i] for all i ∈ I. This is called a selective opening attack (SOA).
The security requirement is that the privacy of the unopened messages, namely m[i 1 ], . . . , m[i n−t ] where {i 1 , . . . , i n−t } = {1, . . . , n} \ I, is preserved. (Meaning the adversary learns nothing more about the unopened messages than it could predict given the opened messages and knowledge of the message distribution. Formal denitions to capture this will be discussed later.) The question is whether SOA-secure encryption schemes exist.
Status and motivation. One's rst impression would be that a simple hybrid argument would show that any IND-CPA scheme is SOA-secure. Nobody has yet been able to push such an argument through. (And, today, regarding whether IND-CPA implies SOA-security we have neither a proof nor a counterexample.)
Next one might think that IND-CCA, at least, would suce, but even this is not known. The diculty of the problem is well understood and documented [22, 13, 16, 38, 18, 14] , and whether or not SOA-secure schemes exist remains open.
Very roughly, the diculties come from a combination of two factors. The rst is that it is the random coins underlying the encryption, not just the messages, that are revealed. The second is that the messages can be related.
We clarify that the problem becomes moot if senders can erase their randomness after encryption, but it is well understood that true and reliable erasure is dicult on a real system. We will only be interested in solutions that avoid erasures.
The problem rst arose in the context of multiparty computation, where it is standard to assume secure communication channels between parties [8, 17] . But, how are these to be implemented? Presumably, via encryption. But due to the fact that parties can be corrupted, the encryption would need to be SOA-secure.
We contend, however, that there are important practical motivations as well. For example, suppose a server has SSL connections with a large number of clients.
Suppose a virus corrupts some fraction of the clients, thereby exposing the randomness underlying their encryptions. Are the encryptions of the uncorrupted clients secure?
Commitment. Notice that possession of the coins allows the adversary to verify that the opening is correct, since it can compute E(pk , m[i]; r [i] ) and check that this equals c[i] for all i ∈ I. This apparent commitment property has been viewed as the core technical diculty in obtaining a proof. The view that commitment is in this way at the heart of the problem has led researchers to formulate and focus on the problem of commitment secure against SOA [22] . Here, think of the algorithm E in our description above as the commitment algorithm of a commitment scheme, with the public key being the empty string. The question is then exactly the same. More generally the commitment scheme could be interactive or have a setup phase.
Independently of the encryption setting, selective openings of commitments commonly arise in zero-knowledge proofs. Namely, often an honest verier may request that the prover opens a subset of a number of previously made commitments. Thus, SOA-security naturally becomes an issue here, particularly when considering the concurrent composition of zero-knowledge proofs (since then, overall more openings from a larger set of commitments may be requested). The security of the unopened commitments is crucial for the zero-knowledge property of such a protocol, and this is exactly what SOA-security of the commitments would guarantee.
Definitions. Previous work [22] has introduced and used a semantic-style security formalization of security under SOA. A contribution of our paper is to provide an alternative indistinguishability-based formalization that we denote IND-SO-ENC for encryption and IND-SO-COM for commitment. We will also refer to semantic security formalizations SEM-SO-ENC and SEM-SO-COM.
Results for encryption
We provide the rst public-key encryption schemes provably secure against selective-opening attack. The schemes have short keys. (Public and secret keys of a xed length suce for encrypting an arbitrary number of messages.) The schemes are stateless and noninteractive, and security does not rely on erasures.
The schemes are without random oracles, proven secure under standard assumptions, and even ecient. We are able to meet both the indistinguishability (IND-SO-ENC) and the semantic security (SEM-SO-ENC) denitions, although under dierent assumptions.
Closer look. The main tool (that we dene and employ) is lossy encryption, an encryption analogue of lossy trapdoor functions [40] that is closely related to meaningful-meaningless encryption [34] and dual-mode encryption [41] . We provide an ecient implementation of lossy encryption based on DDH. We also show that any (suciently) lossy trapdoor function yields lossy encryption, thereby obtaining several other lossy encryption schemes via the lossy trapdoor constructions of [40, 10, 45] .
We then show that any lossy encryption scheme is IND-SO-ENC secure, thereby obtaining numerous IND-SO-ENC secure schemes. If the lossy encryption scheme has an additional property that we call ecient openability, we show that it is also SEM-SO-ENC secure. We observe that the classical quadratic residuosity-based encryption scheme of Goldwasser and Micali [27] is lossy with ecient openability, thereby obtaining SEM-SO-ENC secure encryption. It is interesting in this regard that the solution to a long-standing open problem is a scheme that has been known for 25 years. (Only the proof was missing until now.) Previous work. In the version of the problem that we consider, there is one receiver and many senders. Senders may be corrupted, with the corruption exposing their randomness and message. An alternative version of the problem considers a single sender and many receivers, each receiver having its own public and secret key. Receivers may be corrupted, with corruption exposing their secret key. Previous work has mostly focused on the receiver corruption version of the problem. Canetti, Feige, Goldreich and Naor [13] introduce and implement non-committing encryption, which yields SOA-secure encryption in the receiver corruption setting. However, their scheme does not have short keys. (Both the public and the secret key in their scheme are as long as the total number of message bits ever encrypted.) Furthermore, Nielsen [38] shows that this is necessary. Canetti, Halevi and Katz [16] provide SOA-secure encryption schemes for the receiver corruption setting with short public keys, but they make use of (limited) erasures. (They use a key-evolving system where, at the end of every day, the receiver's key is updated and the previous version of the key is securely erased.) In the symmetric setting, Panjwani [39] proves SOA-security against a limited class of attacks.
Our schemes do not suer from any of the restrictions of previous ones. We have short public and secret keys, do not rely on erasures, and achieve strong notions of security.
A natural question is why our results do not contradict Nielsen's negative result saying that no noninteractive public key encryption scheme with short and xed keys is SOA-secure without erasures for an unbounded number of messages [38] . The reason is that we consider sender corruptions as opposed to receiver corruptions.
Discussion. It has generally been thought that the two versions of the problem (sender or receiver corruptions) are of equal diculty. The reason is that corruptions, in either case, allow the adversary to verify an opening and appear to create a commitment. (Either the randomness or the decryption key suces to verify an opening.) Our work refutes this impression and shows that sender corruptions are easier to handle than receiver ones. Indeed, we can fully resolve the problem in the former case, while the latter case remains open. (Achieving a simulation-based notion for receiver corruptions is ruled out by [38] but achieving an indistinguishability-based notion may still be possible.)
Results for commitment
Previous work. In the zero-knowledge (ZK) setting, Gennaro and Micali [24] notice a selective opening attack and circumvent it by adapting the distribution of the messages committed to. Similarly, a number of works (e.g., Dolev et al.
[21], Prabhakaran et al. [42] in the ZK context) use cut-and-choose techniques on committed values, which is a specic form of selective opening. These works can prove security by using specic properties of the distributions of the committed values (e.g., the fact that the unopened values, conditioned on the opened values, are still uniformly distributed). The rst explicit treatment of SOA-secure commitment is by Dwork, Naor, Reingold, and Stockmeyer [22] . They formalized the problem and dened SEM-SO-COM. On the negative side, they showed that the existence of a one-shot (this means non-interactive and without setup assumptions) SEM-SO-COM-secure commitment scheme implied solutions to other well-known cryptographic problems, namely, three-round ZK and magic functions. This is evidence that simulation-based one-shot SOA-secure commitment is dicult to achieve. In particular, from Goldreich and Krawczyk [26] , it is known that three-round black-box zero-knowledge proof systems exist only for languages in BPP. 3 Closer look. Technically, we derive black-box impossibility results in the style of Impagliazzo and Rudich [32] , but we can derive stronger claims, similar to Dodis et al. [20] . (Dodis et al. [20] show that the security of full-domain hash signatures [4] cannot be proved using a black-box reduction to any hardness assumption that is satised by a random permutation.) Concretely, we prove impossibility of ∀∃semi-black-box proofs from any computational assumption that can be formalized as an oracle X and a corresponding security property P (i.e., a game between a challenger and an adversary) which the oracle satises. For instance, to model one-way permutations, X could be a truly random permutation and P could be the one-way game in which a PPT adversary tries to invert a random image. We emphasize that, somewhat surprisingly, our impossibility claim holds even if P models SOA-security. In that case, however, a reduction will necessarily be non-black-box, see Section 9 for a discussion.
Concurrently to and independently from our work, Haitner and Holenstein [28] developed a framework to prove impossibility of black-box reductions from any computational assumption. While their formalism is very similar to ours (e.g., their denition of a cryptographic game matches our denition of a property), they apply it to an entirely dierent problem, namely, encryption scheme security in the presence of key-dependent messages.
3 Black-box means here that the ZK simulator uses only the (adverserial) verier's next-message function in a black-box way to simulate an authentic interaction. Jumping ahead, we will show that in many cases SOA-secure commitment cannot be proved using a black-box reduction to a standard computational assumption. Both statements are negative, but orthogonal. Indeed, it is conceivable that a security reduction uses specic, non-black-box properties of the adversary (e.g., it is common in reductions to explicitly make use of the adversary's complexity bounds), but neither scheme nor reduction use specics (like the code) of the underlying primitive.
Relation to the encryption results. An obvious question is why our results for encryption and commitment are not contradictive. The answer is that our SOA-secure encryption scheme does not give rise to a commitment scheme.
Our commitment results do show that the SOA-security of an encryption scheme cannot be proved using a black-box reduction, but only if encryption constitutes a commitment. Because 
Notation
For any integer n, let 1 n be its unary representation and let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}. We let a ← b denote assignment to a the result of evaluating b. If b is simply a tuple of values of size m, we will write (b 1 , . . . , b m ) ← b when we mean that b is parsed into b 1 to b m . We let a ←$ b denote choosing a value uniformly at random from random variable b and assigning it to a.
We say a function µ(n) is negligible if µ ∈ o(n −ω(1) ). We let neg(n) denote an arbitrary negligible function. If we say some p(n) = poly(n), we mean that there is some polynomial q such that for all suciently large n, p(n) ≤ q(n). The statistical distance between two random variable X and Y over common domain D is ∆(X, Y ) = 
For any set I (resp. any vector m)(resp. any string m), let |I| (resp. |m|) (resp. |m|) denote the size of the set (resp. length of the vector) (resp. length of the string).
All algorithms in this paper are randomized, unless otherwise specied as being deterministic. (x 1 , x 2 , . . .). When we say an algorithm is ecient, we mean that it runs in polynomial time in its rst input; if the algorithm is randomized we might also say it runs in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT).
An unbounded algorithm does not necessarily run in polynomial time.
3 Encryption Related Denitions
Encryption Schemes
A public-key encryption scheme AE = (K, E, D) is a triple of PT algorithms. The (randomized) key generation algorithm K takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a public key/secret key pair (pk , sk ). The (randomized) encryption algorithm E takes as input a public key pk and a message m and outputs a ciphertext c. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext C and outputs either the decryption m of c, or ⊥, denoting failure. We require the correctness condition that for all (pk , sk ) generated by K, and for all messages m, D(sk, E(pk , m)) = m. The standard notion of security for public-key encryption scheme is indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (ind-cpa).
Encryption Security under Selective Opening
We consider both indistinguishability-based and simulation-based denitions of security for encryption under selective opening which we call ind-so-enc and sem-so-enc, respectively. Indistinguishability-based. For any public-key encryption scheme AE = (K, E, D), any message sampler M, and any adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), we say the ind-so-enc-advantage of A with respect to M is
where the ind-so-enc security experiment is dened in Figure 1 We say that a public-key encryption scheme AE is ind-so-enc-secure if for any ecient message sampler M that supports ecient conditional resampling and for all ecient adversaries A, the ind-so-enc-advantage of A with respect to M is negligible in the security parameter.
In words, the experiment proceeds as follows. The adversary is given a public key pk and n ciphertexts c encrypted under public key pk . The messages corresponding to the n ciphertexts come from the joint distribution M. The adversary then species a set I of t ciphertexts and receives the randomness r[I] The denition is a natural extension of ind-cpa to the selective decryption setting. Intuitively, the denition means that an adversary, after adaptively choosing to open some ciphertexts, cannot distinguish between the actual unopened messages and another set of messages that are equally likely given the opened messages that the adversary has seen.
Simulation-based. For any public-key encryption scheme AE = (K, E, D), any message sampler M, any relation R, any adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), and any simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ), we say the sem-so-enc-advantage of A with respect to M, R, and S is
where the sem-so-enc security experiments are dened in Figure 2 .
We say that a public-key encryption scheme AE is sem-so-enc-secure if for any ecient message sampler M, any eciently computable relation R, and any ecient adversary A, there exists an ecient simulator S such that the sem-so-enc-advantage of A with respect to M, R, and S is negligible in the security parameter.
In words, the experiments proceed as follows. In the sem-so-enc-real experiment, the adversary A is given a public key pk and n ciphertexts c encrypted under public key pk . The messages corresponding to the n ciphertexts come from the joint distribution M. The adversary then species a set I of t ciphertexts and receives the messages m[I] and randomness r[I] used to generate those ciphertexts. The adversary then outputs a string w and the output of the experiment is R(m, w), the relation applied to the message vector and adversary's Fig. 2 . The two security experiments for SEM-SO-ENC output. In the sem-so-enc-ideal experiment, a vector m of messages is chosen and the simulator, given only the security parameter, chooses a set I. The simulator is then given m[I], the messages corresponding to the index set I. Finally, the simulator outputs a string w and the output of the experiment is R(m, w).
Lossy Encryption
The main tool we use in our results is what we call a Lossy Encryption Scheme.
Informally, a lossy encryption scheme is a public-key encryption scheme with a standard key generation algorithm (which produces`real' keys) and a lossy key generation algorithm (which produces`lossy' keys), such that encryptions with real keys are committing, while encryptions with lossy keys are not committing. More formally, a lossy public-key encryption scheme AE = (K, K loss , E, D) is a tuple of PT algorithms dened as follows. The key generation algorithm K takes as input the security parameter 1 λ and outputs a keypair (pk , sk ); we call public keys generated by K real public keys. The lossy key generation algorithm K loss takes as input the security parameter and outputs a keypair (pk , sk ); we call such pk lossy public keys. The encryption algorithm E takes as input a public key pk (either from K or K loss ) and a message m and outputs a ciphertext c. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs either a message m, or ⊥ in the case of failure. We require the following properties from AE:
1. Correctness on real keys. For all (pk , sk ) ←$ K it must be the case that D(sk , E(pk , m)) = m. In other words, when the real key generation algorithm is used, the standard public-key encryption correctness condition must hold.
2. Indistinguishability of real keys from lossy keys. No polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between the rst outputs of K and K loss . We call the advantage of an adversary A distinguishing between the two the lossy-keyadvantage of A and take it to mean the obvious thing, i.e., the probability that A outputs 1 when given the rst output of K is about the same as the probability it outputs 1 when given the rst output of K loss .
3. Lossiness of encryption with lossy keys. For any (pk , sk ) ← K loss and two distinct messages m 0 , m 1 , it must be the case that E(pk , m 0 ) ≡ s E(pk , m 1 ).
We say the advantage of an adversary A in distinguishing between the two is the lossy-ind advantage of A and take it to mean the advantage of A in the standard ind-cpa game when the public key pk in the ind-cpa game is lossy.
Notice that because the ciphertexts are statistically close, even an unbounded distinguisher will have low advantage. We sometimes call ciphertexts created with lossy public keys lossy ciphertexts. 4 . Possible to claim any plaintext. There exists a (possibly unbounded) algorithm Opener that, given a lossy public key pk loss , message m, and ciphertext c = E(pk loss , m), will output r ∈ R Coins E (pk loss , m) such that E(pk loss , m; r ) = c. In other words, Opener will nd correctly distributed randomness to open a lossy ciphertext to the plaintext it encrypts. It then directly follows from the lossiness of encryption that with high probability the opener algorithm can successfully open any ciphertext to any plaintext.
We note that the fourth property is already implied by the rst three properties; the canonical (inecient) Opener algorithm will, given pk loss , m, and c, simply try all possible coins to nd the set of all r such that E(pk loss , m; r) = c and output a random element of that set. Nevertheless, we explicitly include the property because it is convenient in the proofs, and later we will consider variations of the denition which consider other (more ecient) opener algorithms.
We also note that the denition of lossy encryption already implies ind-cpa security. We next provide two instantiations of lossy public-key encryption, one from DDH and one from lossy trapdoor functions.
Instantiation from DDH
We now describe a lossy public-key encryption scheme based on the DDH assumption. Recall that the DDH assumption for cyclic group G of order prime p says that for random generator g ∈ G * (we use G * to denote the generators of G),
The scheme we describe below is originally from [36] , yet some of our notation is taken from the similar dual-mode encryption scheme of [41] . The scheme has structure similar to ElGamal.
Let G be a prime order group of order prime p. The scheme AE ddh = (K, K loss , E, D) is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms dened as follows:
We show that AE ddh satises the four properties of lossy encryption schemes.
1. Correctness on real keys. To see the correctness property is satised, consider a (real) public key pk = (g, g r , g x , g rx ) and corresponding secret key sk = x.
Then, for some message m ∈ G
2. Indistinguishability of real keys from lossy keys. This follows from the assumption that DDH is hard in the groups we are using, since the rst output
3. Lossiness of encryption with lossy keys. We need to show that for any lossy public key pk generated by K loss , and any messages m 0 = m 1 ∈ G, it is the case that E(pk , m 0 ) ≡ s E(pk , m 1 ). The results of Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, and Waters can be applied here (specically Lemma 4 from their paper [41] ).
We repeat their lemma for completeness.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 4 from [41] ). Let G be an arbitrary multiplicative group of prime order p. For each
There is a probabilistic algorithm Rand that takes generators g, h ∈ G and elements g , h ∈ G, and outputs a pair (u, v) ∈ G 2 such that:
The Rand procedure mentioned in the lemma is exactly our Rand procedure dened above. As [41] proves, this lemma shows that encryptions under a lossy key are statistically close, since such encryptions are just pairs of uniformly random group elements. 
For our results, we make use of lossy trapdoor functions, a primitive recently introduced by Peikert and Waters [40] . Informally, a lossy trapdoor function is similar to a traditional injective trapdoor function, but with the extra property that the trapdoor function is indistinguishable from another function that loses information about its input. We recall the denition from Peikert and Waters (with minor notational changes):
Denition 2 (Collection of (n, k) Lossy Trapdoor Functions). Let λ be a security parameter, n = n(λ) = poly(λ), and We now describe an instantiation of lossy encryption based on lossy trapdoor functions.
Let λ be a security parameter and let (S tdf , S loss , F tdf , F −1 tdf ) dene a collection of (n, k)-lossy trapdoor functions. Also let H be a collection of pairwise independent hash functions from n bits to bits; the message space of the cryptosystem will then be {0, 1} . The parameter should be such that ≤ k − 2 log(1/δ), where δ is a negligible function in the security parameter λ. The scheme AE loss = (K, K loss , E, D) is then dened as follows:
The K loss algorithm is simply the same as K, but using S loss instead of S tdf . (In this case, the trapdoor t will be ⊥.)
We now show that AE loss satises the four properties of lossy encryption schemes.
1. Correctness on real keys. This follows since when pk = (s, h) was generated by K, s is such that (s, t) ←$ S tdf (1 λ ) and h ←$ H so that
Indistinguishability of real keys from lossy keys. We need to show that any ecient adversary has low lossy-key advantage in distinguishing between a real public key (s, h) and a lossy key (s , h ),
Since s is the rst output of S tdf and s is the rst output of S loss , we use the third property of lossy trapdoor functions, specically that the function indices outputted by S tdf and S loss are computationally indistinguishable.
3. Lossiness of encryption with lossy keys. We need to show that for any lossy public key pk generated by K loss , and any messages m 0 = m 1 ∈ {0, 1} , it is the case that E(pk , m 0 ) ≡ s E(pk , m 1 ). As Peikert and Waters show in [40] , this is true because of the lossiness of f s (where s is part of pk , generated by S loss ). Specically, they show that the average min-entropỹ H ∞ (x|(c 1 , pk )) of the random variable x, given f s (x) and pk is at least k, and since ≤ k − 2 log(1/δ), it follows that h(x) will be δ-close to uniform and m b ⊕ h(x) will also be δ-close to uniform for either bit b.
4. Possible to claim any plaintext. Again, the opener is simply the canonical opener that is guaranteed to be correct by the rst three properties. Specically, the (unbounded) algorithm Opener, on input a public key pk = (s, h), message m ∈ {0, 1} , and ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ) = (f s (x), h(x)⊕m) for some x ∈ {0, 1} n and m ∈ {0, 1} , must output x ∈ {0, 1} n such that f s (x ) = c 1 and h(x )⊕m = c 2 . To do so, Opener enumerates over all {0, 1} n and creates
An Extension: Ecient Opening
Recall that in the above denition of lossy encryption, the Opener algorithm could be unbounded. We will now consider a renement of the denition that will be useful for achieving the simulation-based selective opening denition. We say that a PKE scheme AE is a lossy encryption scheme with ecient opening if it satises the following four properties:
1. Correctness on real keys. For all (pk , sk ) ←$ K it must be the case that
2. Indistinguishability of real keys from lossy keys. No polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between the rst outputs of K and K loss .
3. Lossiness of encryption with lossy keys. For any (pk , sk ) ← K loss and two distinct messages m 0 , m 1 , it must be the case that E(pk , m 0 ) ≡ i E(pk , m 1 ).
Notice that we require ciphertexts to be identically distributed.
4. Possible to eciently claim any plaintext. There exists an ecient algorithm Opener that on input lossy keys sk loss and pk loss , message m , and ciphertext c = E(pk loss , m), outputs an r ∈ R Coins E (pk loss , m ) such that E(pk loss , m ; r ) = c. In words, the algorithm Opener is able to open ciphertexts to arbitrary plaintexts eciently.
We emphasize that it is important for the opener algorithm to take as input the lossy secret key. This may seem strange, since in the two schemes described above the lossy secret key was simply ⊥, but this need not be the case.
The GM Probabilistic Encryption Scheme
The Goldwasser-Micali Probabilistic encryption scheme [27] is an example of a lossy encryption scheme with ecient opening. We briey recall the GM scheme.
Let Par be an algorithm that eciently chooses two large random primes p and q and outputs them along with their product N . Let J p (x) denote the Jacobi symbol of x modulo p. We denote by QR N the group of quadratic residues modulo N and we denote by QNR +1 N the group of quadratic non-residues x such that J N (x) = +1. Recall that the security of the GM scheme is based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, which states that it is dicult to distinguish a random element of QR N from a random element of QNR +1 N . The
The algorithm K loss is the same as K except that x is chosen at random from QR N instead of QNR +1 N ; in the lossy case the secret key is still the factorization of N .
It is easy to see that the scheme AE GM meets the rst three properties of lossy PKE schemes with ecient opening: the correctness of the scheme under real keys was shown in [27] , the indistinguishability of real keys from lossy keys follows directly from the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, and encryptions under lossy keys are lossy since in that case all ciphertexts are just sequences of random quadratic residues. We claim that AE GM is also eciently openable. To see this consider the (ecient) algorithm Opener that takes as input secret key sk = (p, q), public key pk = (N, x), plaintext m, and encryption c. 
SOA-Security from Lossy Encryption
We now state our main results for encryption: any lossy public-key encryption scheme is ind-so-enc-secure, and any lossy public-key encryption scheme with ecient opening is sem-so-enc-secure.
Theorem 1 (Lossy Encryption implies IND-SO-ENC security). Let λ be a security parameter, AE = (K, K lossy , E, D) be any lossy public-key encryption scheme, M any eciently samplable distribution that supports ecient resampling, and A be any polynomial-time adversary corrupting t = t(λ) parties. Then, there exists an unbounded lossy-ind adversary C and an ecient lossy-key adversary B such that
Proof. We will prove the theorem using a sequence of game transitions. We start with a game that is simply the ind-so-enc experiment run with A, and end with a game in which A has no advantage, showing that each subsequent game is either computationally or statistically indistinguishable from the previous game. Now, we know that by the denition of ind-so-enc-security (see Section 3.2). We will now explain the game transitions.
G 0 : The same as the ind-so-enc experiment. G 1 : The only change is that the A 1 is given a lossy public key and lossy ciphertexts.
H 0 : Instead of opening the ciphertexts corresponding to index I (provided by A 1 ) by revealing the actual coins used to generate the ciphertexts, H 0 runs the Opener algorithm on the actual messages and ciphertexts and gives A 2 the coins outputted. By the denition of the Opener algorithm (see Section 4), the coins will be correctly distributed and consistent with the ciphertexts.
We generalize H 0 with a sequence of hybrid games. In the jth hybrid game, the rst j ciphertexts given to A 1 are encryptions of dummy messages instead of the rst j messages outputted by M. Yet, the game still opens the ciphertexts for A 2 to the actual messages produced by M using the Opener algorithm.
H n : In the last hybrid game, A 1 is given encryptions of only the dummy message, yet A 2 receives openings of the ciphertexts to the actual messages generated by M.
We rst claim that there is an ecient adversary B such that
To see this consider a B that is given a challenge public key pk * and must decide whether or not it is lossy. The adversary uses the ind-so-enc-adversary A and executes exactly the same as G 0 and G 1 , giving the adversary the challenge key pk * and ciphertexts generated using pk * . It is important for the conditional resamplability of M to be ecient in order for adversary B to be ecient.
Next, we claim that
Recall We can now use a standard hybrid arguments to claim there is an unbounded adversary C such that
Adversary C, on input a lossy public key pk * , will operate the same as H j (for some guess j) except that it will use the challenge key, and for the jth Finally, we claim that
which is true since in H n the adversary A 1 is given encryptions of dummy messages and has no information about the messages chosen from M. (In fact, we could modify the games again and move the choice of the messages to after receiving I from A 1 .)
Combining the above equations, we see that
which proves the theorem.
Theorem 2 (Lossy Encryption with Ecient Opening implies SEM-SO-ENC security). Let λ be a security parameter, AE = (K, K lossy , E, D) be any lossy public-key encryption scheme with ecient opening, M any eciently samplable distribution, R an eciently computable relation, and A = (A 1 , A 2 )
be any polynomial-time adversary corrupting t = t(λ) parties. Then, there exists an ecient simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) and ecient lossy-key adversary B such that Proof (Sketch). The proof of Theorem 2 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1, so we will only sketch it here. For more details see [7] . We can modify the sem-so-enc-real experiment step by step until we have a successful simulator in the sem-so-enc-ideal experiment. Consider the following sequence of games:
G 0 : The sem-so-enc-real experiment. G 1 : Same as G 0 except the adversary A 1 is given a lossy public key.
The games are indistinguishable by the second property of eciently openable lossy encryption.
G 2 : Instead of giving A 2 the actual randomness r[I], the experiment uses the ecient Opener procedure. G 3 : Adversary A 1 is given encryptions of dummy messages, but A 2 is still given openings to the actual messages in m. To do this, the ecient Opener algorithm is applied to the dummy ciphertexts.
We can then construct a simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) that runs A exactly as its run in G 3 . Specically, S chooses a lossy keypair and runs A 1 with a vector of encryptions of dummy messages. When A 1 outputs a set I, S asks for the same set I and learns messages m I . The simulator then uses the ecient Opener algorithm to open the dummy ciphertexts to the values m I and nally outputs the same w as A 2 . Thus, the game G 3 is identical to the sem-so-enc-ideal experiment run with simulator S. Since all of the games are close, the theorem follows. 
In this, A, S denotes the output of A after interacting with S, and R, A denotes the output of R after interacting with A. We say that Com is a commitment scheme i the following holds: Syntax Denition 4 (Non-interactive commitment scheme). A non-interactive commitment scheme is a commitment scheme Com = (S, R) in which both commit and opening phase consist of only one message sent from S to R. We can treat a non-interactive commitment scheme as a pair of algorithms rather than machines. Namely, we write (com, dec) ←$ S(m) shorthand for the commit message com and opening message dec sent by S on input m. We also denote by m ←$ R(com, dec) the nal output of R upon receiving com in the commit phase and dec in the opening phase.
Note that perfectly binding implies that any commitment can only be opened to at most one value m. Perfectly binding (non-interactive) commitment schemes can be achieved from any one-way permutation (e.g., Blum [9] ). On the other hand, statistically hiding implies that for any m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} λ , the statistical distance between the respective views of the receiver in the commit phase is negligible. One-way functions suce to implement statistically hiding (interactive) commitment schemes (Haitner and Reingold [29] ), but there are certain lower bounds for the communication complexity of such constructions (Wee [47] , Haitner et al. [30] ). However, if we assume the existence of (families of ) collision-resistant hash functions, then even constant-round statistically hiding commitment schemes exist (Damgård et al. [19] , Naor and Yung [37] ).
Interactive argument systems and zero-knowledge. We recall some basic denitions concerning interactive argument systems, mostly following Goldreich [25] .
Denition 5 (Interactive proof/argument system). An interactive proof system for a language L with witness relation R is a pair of PPT machines IP = (P, V) such that the following holds: Completeness. For every family (x λ , w λ ) λ∈N such that R(x λ , w λ ) for all λ and |x λ | is polynomial in λ, we have that the probability for V(x λ ) to output 1 after interacting with P(x λ , w λ ) is at least 2/3.
Soundness. For every machine P * and every family (x λ , z λ ) λ∈N such that |x λ | = λ and x λ ∈ L for all λ, we have that the probability for V(x λ ) to output 1 after interacting with P * (x λ , z λ ) is at most 1/3. If the soundness condition holds for all PPT machines P * (but not necessarily for all unbounded P * ), then IP is an interactive argument system. We say that IP enjoys perfect completeness if V always outputs 1 in the completeness condition. Furthermore, IP has negligible soundness error if V outputs 1 only with negligible probability in the soundness condition.
Denition 6 (Zero-knowledge). Let IP = (P, V) be an interactive proof or argument system for language L with witness relation R. IP is zero-knowledge if for every PPT machine V * , there exists a PPT machine S * such that for all sequences (x, w) = (x λ , w λ ) λ∈N with R(x λ , w λ ) for all λ and |x λ | polynomial in λ, for all PPT machines D, and all auxiliary inputs z
denotes the transcript of the interaction between the prover P and V * . Most known interactive proof system achieve perfect completeness. Conversely, most systems do not enjoy a negligible soundness error by nature; their soundness has to be amplied via repetition, e.g., via sequential or concurrent composition. Thus, it is important to consider the concurrent composition of an interactive argument system: Denition 7 (Concurrent zero-knowledge). Let IP = (P, V) be an interactive proof or argument system for language L with witness relation R. IP is zero-knowledge under concurrent composition i for every polynomial n = n(λ) and PPT machine V * , there exists a PPT machine S * such that for all sequences (x, w) = (x i,λ , w i,λ ) λ∈N,i∈[n] with R(x i,λ , w i,λ ) for all i, λ and |x i,λ | polynomial in λ, for all PPT machines D, and all auxiliary inputs z
denotes the transcript of the interaction between n copies of the prover P (with the respective inputs (x i,λ , w i,λ ) for i = 1, . . . , n) on the one hand, and V * on the other hand.
There exist interactive proof systems (with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error) that achieve Denition 7 for arbitrary NP-languages if one-way permutations exist (e.g., Richardson and Kilian [44] ; see also [33, 15, 1, 23, 3] for similar results in related settings). If we assume the existence of (families of ) collision-resistant hash functions, then there even exist constant-round interactive proof systems that achieve a bounded version of Denition 7 in which the number of concurrent instances is xed in advance (Barak [1] , Barak and Goldreich [2] ). 4 Black-box reductions. Reingold et al. [43] give an excellent overview and classication of black-box reductions. We recall some of their denitions which are important for our case. A primitive P = (F P , R P ) is a set F P of functions f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * along with a relation R over pairs (f, A), where f ∈ F P , and
A is a machine. We say that f is an implementation of P i f ∈ F P . Furthermore, f is an ecient implementation of P i f ∈ F P and f can be computed by a PPT machine. A machine A P-breaks f ∈ F P i R P (f, A). A primitive P exists if there is an ecient implementation f ∈ F P such that no PPT machine P-breaks f . A primitive P exists relative to an oracle B i there exists an implementation f ∈ F P which is computable by a PPT machine with access to B, such that no PPT machine with access to B P-breaks f .
Denition 8 (Relativizing reduction).
There exists a relativizing reduction from a primitive P = (F P , R P ) to a primitive Q = (F Q , R Q ) i for every oracle B, the following holds: if Q exists relative to B, then so does P. Denition 9 (∀∃semi-black-box reduction). There exists a ∀∃semi-blackbox reduction from a primitive P = (F P , R P ) to a primitive Q = (F Q , R Q ) i for every implementation f ∈ F Q , there exists a PPT machine G such that G f ∈ F P , and the following holds: if there exists a PPT machine A such that A f P-breaks G f , then there exists a PPT machine S such that S f Q-breaks f .
It can be seen that if a relativizing reduction exists, then so does a ∀∃semi-blackbox reduction. The converse is true when Q allows embedding, which essentially means that additional oracles can be embedded into Q without destroying its functionality (see Reingold et al. [43] , Denition 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 and Simon [46] ). Below we will prove impossibility of relativizing reductions between certain primitives, which also proves impossibility of ∀∃semi-black-box reductions, since the corresponding primitives Q allow embedding.
Simulation-based Commitment Security under Selective Openings
Consider the following real security game: adversary A gets, say, n commitments, and then may ask for openings of some of them. The security notion of Dwork 4 It is common to allow the simulator S * to be expected polynomial-time. In fact, the positive results [44, 33] (but not [1] ) construct an expected PPT S * . We will neglect this issue in the following, since our results do not depend the complexity of S * (as long as S * is not able to break an underlying computational assumption). et al. [22] Denition 10 (SEM-SO-COM). Assume n = n(λ) > 0 is polynomially bounded, and let I = (I n ) n be a family of sets such that each I n is a set of subsets of [n] . A commitment scheme Com = (S, R) is simulatable under selective openings (short SEM-SO-COM secure) i for every PPT n-message distribution M, every PPT relation R, and every PPT machine A (the adversary), there is a PPT machine S (the simulator), such that Adv sem-so Com,M,A,S,R is negligible. Here 
In this, we require from A that I ∈ I λ , 5 and we denote by A, (S i ) i the output of A after interacting concurrently with instances S i of S. We do not explicitly hand the chosen set I to the relation R. Handing I to R potentially makes the denition more useful in larger contexts in which I is public.
One could think of letting R determine the message vector m. 6 (Equivalently, we can view M as part of R and let M forward its random coinsor a short 5 that is, we actually only quantify over those A for which I ∈ I λ 6 This denition is closer to a universally composable denition (cf. Canetti [11] ) in the sense that R (almost) takes the role of a UC-environment: R selects all inputs and reads the outputs (in particular the output of A). However, we stress that R may not actively interfere in the commitment protocol. Note that we cannot hope for fully UC-secure commitments for reasons not connected to the selective decommitment problem, cf. Canetti and Fischlin [12] .
seedto R in a message part m[i] which is guaranteed not to be opened, e.g., when i ∈ I for all I ∈ I n .) The order of quantiers (∀M, R, A∃S) is the weakest one possible. In particular, we do not mandate that S is constructed from A in a black-box way.
In all of the cases, we chose the weaker denitional variant for simplicity, which makes our negative results only stronger. We stress, however, that our positive results (Theorem 4 and Theorem 6) hold also for all of the stronger denitional variants.
Impossibility from black-box reductions
Formalization of computational assumptions. Our rst negative result states that SEM-SO-COM security cannot be achieved via black-box reductions from standard assumptions. We want to consider such standard assumptions in a general way that allows to make statements even in the presence of relativizing oracles. Thus we make the following denition, which is a special case of the denition of a primitive from Reingold et al. [43] (cf. also Section 6).
Denition 11 (Property of an oracle). Let X be an oracle. Then a property P of X is a (not necessarily PPT) machine that, after interacting with X and another machine A, nally outputs a bit b. For an adversary A (that may interact with X and P), we dene A's advantage against P as Adv prop P,X ,A := Pr[P outputs b = 1 after interacting with A and X ] − 1/2. Now X is said to satisfy property P i for all PPT adversaries A, we have that Adv prop P,X ,A is negligible.
In terms of Reingold et al. [43] , the corresponding primitive is P = (F P , R P ), where F P = {X }, and R P (X , A) i Adv prop P,X ,A is non-negligible. Our denition is also similar in spirit to hard games as used by Dodis et al. [20] , but more general.
We emphasize that P can only interact with X and A, but not with possible additional oracles. (See Section 9 for further discussion of properties of oracles, in particular their role in our proofs.) Intuitively, P acts as a challenger in the sense of a cryptographic security experiment. That is, P tests whether adversary A can break X in the intended way. We give an example, where breaking means breaking X 's one-way property.
Example. If X is a random permutation of {0, 1} λ , then the following P models X 's one-way property: P acts as a challenger that challenges A to invert a randomly chosen X -image. Concretely, P initially chooses a random Y ∈ {0, 1} λ and sends Y to A. Upon receiving a guess X ∈ {0, 1} λ from A, P checks if X (X) = Y . If yes, then P terminates with output b = 1. If X (X) = Y , then P tosses an unbiased coin b ∈ {0, 1} and terminates with output b = b .
We stress that we only gain generality by demanding that Pr[P outputs 1] is close to 1/2 (and not, say, negligible). In fact, this way indistinguishabilitybased games (such as, e.g., the indistinguishability of ciphertexts of an ideal encryption scheme X ) can be formalized very conveniently. On the other hand, cryptographic games like the one-way game above can be formulated in this framework as well, by letting the challenger output b = 1 with probability 1/2 when A fails.
On the role of property P. Our upcoming results state the impossibility of (black-box) security reductions, from essentially any computational assumption (i.e., property) P. The obvious question is: what if the assumption already is an idealized commitment scheme secure under selective openings? The short answer is: then the security proof will not be black-box. We give a detailed explanation of what is going on in Section 9.
Stateless breaking oracles. In our impossibility results, we will describe a computational world with a number of oracles. For instance, there will be a breaking oracle B, such that B aids in breaking the SEM-SO-COM security of any given commitment scheme, and in nothing more. To this end, B takes the role of the adversary in the SEM-SO-COM experiment. Namely, B expects to receive a number of commitments, then chooses a subset of these commitments, and then expects openings of the commitments in this subset. This is an interactive process which would usually require B to hold a state across invocations. However, stateful oracles are not very useful for establishing black-box separations, so we will have to give a stateless formulation of B. Concretely, suppose that the investigated commitment scheme is non-interactive. Then B answers deterministically upon queries and expects each query to be prexed with the history of that query. For instance, B nally expects to receive openings dec = (dec[i]) i∈I along with the corresponding previous commitments com = (com[i]) i∈[n] and previously selected set I. If I is not the set that B would have selected when receiving com alone, then B ignores the query. This way, B is stateless (but randomized, similarly to a random oracle). Furthermore, for non-interactive commitment schemes, this makes sure that any machine interacting with B can open commitments to B only in one way. Hence this formalization preserves the binding property of a commitment scheme, something which we will need in our proofs.
We stress, however, that this method does not necessarily work for interactive commitment schemes. Namely, any machine interacting with such a stateless B can essentially rewind B during an interactive commitment phase, since B formalizes a next-message function. Now if the commitment scheme is still binding if the receiver of the commitment can be rewound (e.g., this holds trivially for non-interactive commitment schemes, and also for perfectly binding commitment schemes), then our formalization of B preserves binding, and our upcoming proof works. If, however, the commitment scheme loses its binding property if the receiver can be rewound, then the following theorem cannot be applied.
We are now ready to state our result.
Theorem 3 (Black-box impossibility of non-interactive or perfectly binding SEM-SO-COM, most general formulation). Let n = n(λ) = 2λ, and let I = (I n ) n with I n = {I ⊆ [n] | |I| = n/2} denote the set of all n/2-sized subsets of [n].
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Let X be an oracle that satises property P. Then there is a set of oracles relative to which X still satises property P, but there exists no noninteractive or perfectly binding commitment scheme which is simulatable under selective openings.
Proof strategy. We will use a random oracle RO that, for any given noninteractive commitment scheme Com * , induces a message distribution alone (that would require a brute-force search over exponentially many values), this shows that Com * is not SEM-SO-COM secure. Consequently, because Com * was arbitrary (only the message distribution M * is specic to Com * ), there exist no SEM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes relative to RO and B. Finally, it is easy to see that relative to RO and B, primitive X still satises property P. Concretely, observe that B does not break any commitment (note that B's answer depends only on the opened commitments), but only inverts a message distribution (or, rather, RO). Hence, any adversary attacking property P of X can use ecient internal simulations of RO and B instead of the original oracles. Since X satises property P with respect to adversaries without (additional) oracle access, the claim follows.
7 We stress that the proofs of Theorem 3 and Theorem 5 hold literally also for the cut-and
The following corollary provides an instantiation of Theorem 3 for a number of standard cryptographic primitives.
Corollary 1 (Black-box impossibility of non-interactive or perfectly binding SEM-SO-COM). Assume n and I as in Theorem 3. Then no noninteractive or perfectly binding commitment scheme can be proved simulatable under selective openings via a ∀∃semi-black-box reduction to one or more of the following primitives: one-way functions, one-way permutations, trapdoor oneway permutations, IND-CCA secure public key encryption, homomorphic public key encryption.
The corollary is a special case of Theorem 3. For instance, to show Corollary 1 for one-way permutations, one can use the example X and P from above: X is a random permutation of {0, 1} λ , and P models the one-way experiment with X .
Clearly, X satises P, and so we can apply Corollary 1. This yields impossibility of relativizing proofs for SEM-SO-COM security from one-way permutations. We get impossibility for ∀∃semi-black-box reductions since one-way permutations allow embedding, cf. Simon [46] , Reingold et al. [43] . The other cases are similar.
Note that while it is generally not easy to even give a candidate for a cryptographic primitive in the standard model, it is easy to construct an idealized, say, encryption scheme in oracle form.
We stress that Corollary 1 makes no assumptions about the nature of the simulation (in the sense of Denition 10). In particular, the simulator may freely use, e.g., the code of the adversary; the only restriction is black-box access to the underlying primitive. As discussed in the introduction, this is quite dierent from the result one gets upon combining Goldreich and Krawczyk [26] and Dwork et al. [22] : essentially, combining [26, 22] shows impossibility of constructing S in a black-box way from A (i.e., such that S only gets black-box access to A's next-message function).
Generalizations. First, Corollary 1 constitutes merely an example instantiation of the much more general Theorem 3. Second, the proof also holds for a relaxation of SEM-SO-COM security considered by Dwork et al. [22] , Denition 7.3, where adversary and simulator approximate a function of the message vector.
Possibility using non-black-box techniques
Non-black-box techniques vs. interaction. Theorem 3 shows that SEM-SO-COM security cannot be achieved unless one uses non-black-box techniques or interaction. In this section, we will investigate the power of non-black-box techniques to achieve SEM-SO-COM security. As it turns out, for our purposes a concurrently composable zero-knowledge argument system is a suitable nonblack-box tool. 8 We stress that the use of this zero-knowledge argument makes 8 We require concurrent composability since the SEM-SO-COM denition considers multiple, concurrent sessions of the commitment scheme.
our scheme necessarily interactive, and so actually circumvents Theorem 3 in two ways: by non-black-box techniques and by interaction. However, from a conceptual point of view, our scheme is non-interactive up to the zero-knowledge argument. In particular, our proof does not use the fact that the zero-knowledge argument is interactive. (That is, if we used a concurrently composable noninteractive zero-knowledge argument in, say, the common reference string model, our proof would still work.)
The scheme. For our non-black-box scheme, we need an interactive argument system IP with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error, such that IP is zero-knowledge under concurrent composition. We also need a perfectly binding non-interactive commitment scheme Com b . Both these ingredients can be constructed from one-way permutations. To ease presentation, we only describe a bit commitment scheme, which is easily extended (along with the proof ) to the multi-bit case. In a nutshell, the sender S ZK commits twice (using Com b ) to the the same bit and proves in zero-knowledge (using IP) that the committed bits are the same. 9 In the opening phase, the sender opens one (randomly selected) commitment. Note that this overall commitment scheme is binding, since IP ensures that both commitments contain the same bits, and the underlying commitment Commitment to bit b:
2. S ZK uses IP to prove to R ZK that com 0 and com 1 commit to the same bit. 10 9 We note that a FOCS referee, reviewing an earlier version of this paper without
ZKCom, also suggested to employ zero-knowledge to prove consistency of a given commitment. This suggestion was independent of the eprint version of this paper which at that time already contained our scheme ZKCom. A Eurocrypt referee, reviewing a version of the paper with ZKCom, remarked that alternative constructions of a SEM-SO-COM secure commitment scheme are possible. A more generic construction could be along the lines of commit using a perfectly binding commitment, then prove consistency of commitment or opening using concurrent zero-knowledge.
10 Formally, the corresponding language L for IP consists of statements x = (com 0 , com 1 ) and witnesses w = (dec
Opening:
1. S ZK uniformly chooses j ∈ {0, 1} and sends (j, dec j ) to R Where is the non-black-box component? Interestingly, the used argument system IP itself can well be black-box zero-knowledge (where black-box zeroknowledge means that the simulator S * from Denition 7 has only black-box access to the next-message function of V * ). The essential fact that allows us to circumvent our negative result Theorem 3 is the way we employ IP. Namely, ZKCom uses IP to prove a statement about two given commitments (com 0 , com 1 ). Motivated by the impossibility result from the previous section, we now relax Denition 10 as follows:
Denition 13 (IND-SO-COM). Let n = n(λ) > 0 be polynomially bounded, and let I = (I n ) n be a family of sets such that each I n is a set of subsets of 
Again, we require from A that I ∈ I λ , and we denote by A, (S i ) i the output of when applying the denition in some larger reduction proof. However, there simply seems to be no other way to capture indistinguishability, since the set of opened commitments depends on the commitments themselves. In particular, in general we cannot predict which commitments the adversary wants opened, and then, say, substitute the not-to-be-opened commitments with random commitments. What we chose to do instead is to give the adversary either the full message vector, or an independent message vector which could be the full message vector, given the opened commitments. We believe that this is the canonical way to capture secrecy of the unopened commitments under selective openings.
The relation between SEM-SO-COM and IND-SO-COM security. Unfortunately, we ( non-negligibly. We stress that our upcoming negative result also applies to this relaxed notion.
Impossibility from black-box reductions
Theorem 5 (Black-box impossibility of perfectly binding IND-SO-COM, most general formulation). Let n = n(λ) = 2λ, and let I = (I n ) n with I n = {I ⊆ [n] | |I| = n/2} denote the set of all n/2-sized subsets of [n] . Let X be an oracle that satises a property P even in presence of an EXPSPACEoracle. We also assume that X is computable in EXPSPACE.
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Then, there exists a set of oracles relative to which X still satises P, but no perfectly binding commitment scheme is indistinguishable under selective openings.
Proof outline. Similarly to Theorem 3, we specify an oracle RO which induces a message distribution M * . This time, however, RO maps E n/2+1 -elements to message vectors in E n , where E = {0, 1} independent of the random coins used by X . Indeed, B needs to check that for all syntactically possible commitments and decommitments, and all possible random coins used by X , the opened message is unique. Hence, by assumption about X , this test can also be performed by A using an EXPSPACE-oracle, and the above proof idea applies.
On the requirement on X . We stress that the requirement in Theorem 5 on X is a rather mild one. For instance, random oracles are one-way even against computationally unbounded adversaries, as long as the adversary makes only a polynomial number of oracle queries. Hence, an EXPSPACE-oracle (which itself does not perform oracle queries) is not helpful in breaking a random oracle. So similarly to Corollary 1, we get for concrete choices of X and P: Fix arbitrary n and I as in Denition 13, and let Com = (S, R) be a statistically hiding commitment scheme. Then Com is indistinguishable under selective openings in the sense of Denition 13.
Proof outline. Intuitively, the claim holds since an adversary A's views in the real, resp. ideal IND-SO-COM experiment are statistically close (and hence so must be A's outputs). However, the fact that A's views are indeed statistically close is less obvious than it may seem at rst glance. Our proof proceeds in games and starts with the real IND-SO-COM experiment with A. As a rst modication, we change the opening phase of the experiment, so that the opening of each selected commitment is produced solely from the commitment itself and the target message m[i] to which it should be opened (but not from opening information previously generated alongside the commitment). Note that this change is merely conceptual and does not alter A's view at all. This makes the opening phase inecient, but since we are dealing with statistically hiding commitment schemes, we need not worry about that. Indeed, by the statistical hiding property, we can now substitute all commitments (in a hybrid argument) with commitments to a xed value (say, 0 λ ) without aecting the experiment output. We can reduce this step to the hiding property of the commitment scheme since the experiment only needs commitments as input, and produces all openings on its own. At this point, all commitments that A gets are independent of m, and so the whole view of A is independent of the unopened values m[ 9 On the role of property P The intuitive contradiction. The formulations of Theorem 3 and Theorem 5 seem intuitively much too general: essentially they claim impossibility of black-box proofs from any computational assumption which is formulated as a property P of an oracle X . Why can't we choose X to be an ideally secure commitment scheme, and P a property that models precisely what we want to achieve, e.g., Denition 13 (i.e., IND-SO-COM security)? After all, Denition 13 can be rephrased as a property P by letting A choose a message distribution M and send this distribution (as a description of a PPT algorithm M) to P. Then, P could perform the Exp ind-so-real Com,M,A or the Exp ind-so-ideal Com,M,A experiment with A, depending on an internal coin toss (the output of P will then depend on A's output and on that coin toss). This P models Denition 13, in the sense that Also, using a truly random permutation as a basis, it is natural to assume that we can construct an ideal (i.e., as an oracle) perfectly binding commitment scheme X that satises P. (Note that although X is perfectly binding, A's view may still be almost statistically independent of the unopened messages, since the scheme X is given in oracle form.)
Hence, if the assumption essentially is already IND-SO-COM security, we can certainly achieve IND-SO-COM security (in particular, using a trivial reduction), and this seems to contradict Theorem 5. So where is the problem?
Resolving the situation. The problem in the above argument is that Psecurity (our assumption) implies IND-SO-COM security (our goal) in a fundamentally non-black-box way. Namely, the proof converts an IND-SO-COM adversary A and a message distribution M into a P-adversary A that sends a description of M to P. This very step makes use of an explicit representation of the message distribution M, and this is what makes the whole proof nonblack-box. In other words, this way of achieving IND-SO-COM security cannot be black-box, and there is no contradiction to our results.
Viewed from a dierent angle, the essence of our impossibility proofs is: build a very specic message distribution, based on oracles (RO, resp. C), such that another breaking oracle B breaks this message distribution if and only if the adversary can prove that he can open commitments. This step relies on the fact that we can specify message distributions which depend on oracles. Relative to such oracles, property P still holds (as we prove), but may not reect IND-SO-COM security anymore. Namely, since P itself cannot access additional oracles 12 , P is also not able to sample a message space that depends on additional (i.e., on top of X ) oracles. So in our reduction, although A itself can, both in the IND-SO-COM experiment and when interacting with P, access all oracles, it will not be able to communicate a message distribution M that depends on additional oracles (on top of X ) to P. On the other hand, any PPT algorithm M, as formalized in Denition 13, can access all available oracles. So for the above modeling of IND-SO-COM as a property P in the sense of Denition 11, our impossibility results still hold, but become meaningless (since basically using property P makes the proof non-black-box). In a certain sense, this comes from the fact that the modeling of IND-SO-COM as a property P is inherently non-black-box. A similar argument holds for the message distribution in the SEM-SO-COM experiment; there, however, we face the additional problem of modeling the existence of a simulator in a property.
What computational assumptions can be formalized as properties in a black-box way? Fortunately, most standard computational assumptions can be modeled in a black-box way as a property P. Besides the mentioned one-way property (and its variants), in particular, e.g., the IND-CCA security game for encryption schemes can be modeled. Observe that in this game, we can let the IND-CCA adversary himself sample challenge messages m 0 , m 1 for the IND-CCA experiment from his favorite distribution; no PPT algorithm has to be transported to the security game. In fact, the only properties which do not allow for black-box proofs are those that involve an explicit transmission of code (i.e., a description of a circuit or a Turing machine). In that sense, the formulation of Theorem 3 and Theorem 5 is very general and useful.
(Non-)programmable random oracles. We stress that the black-box requirement for random oracles (when used in the role of X ) corresponds to non-programmable random oracles (as used by, e.g., Bellare and Rogaway [5]) 12 by Denition 11, P must be specied independently of additional oracles; if we did allow P to access additional oracles, this would break our impossibility proofs as opposed to programmable random oracles (as used by, e.g., Nielsen [38] ).
Roughly, a proof in the programmable random oracle model translates an attack on a cryptographic scheme into an attack on a simulated random oracle (that is, an oracle completely under control of simulator). Naturally, such a reduction is not black-box. And indeed, with programmable random oracles, even noninteractive SEM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes can be built relatively painlessly. As an example, [38] proves a simple encryption scheme (which can be interpreted as a non-interactive commitment scheme) secure under selective openings.
